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Home > MSI Degree > Course Catalogue > Course Description
SI 687: Matching Mechanisms
Matching is the allocation of indivisible items to people. Traditionally a topic in operations research, it is now a frontier research area in economic design where, unlike OR, agent incentives are explicitly modeled and analyzed. Examples include the allocation of resources in collaboratories, the national residence matching, house allocation, school choice, and kidney exchange. Upon completion of this course, students have a broad understanding of situations where it may be valuable to explicitly consider individual incentives when engineering systems; are able to recognize the class of mechanism that would be appropriate to particular real-world settings; and are able to identify the key design consideration in adapting such mechanisms to particular settings. In addition, doctoral students should be able to prove the game theoretic properties of existing or new institutions.
Credits: 1.5
Term offered: Fall
Prerequisites:
SI 563 or permission of instructor (Session 1; 686 is Session 2)
Home > MSI Degree > Course Catalogue > Course Description
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