EC'06
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Workshop Schedule
June 11, 2006
08:00 - 9:30
Registration in Rackham Lobby
08:30 - 9:00
Coffee in Assembly Hall East Alcove
09:30 - 5:30
Registration outside Assembly Hall
09:00 - 10:20
AM Session
10:20 - 10:40
Break
10:40 - 12:30
AM Session
12:30 - 02:00
Lunch
02:00 - 03:20
PM Session
03:20 - 03:40
Break
03:40 - 05:30
PM Session

W1. Workshop on Sponsored Search
Organizers: Brendan Kitts, Chris Meek, Jason Hartline and Kursad Asdemir

There has been a growing interest in the area as Web search becomes a part of everyday life as the most frequently used method of finding information and the search industry is growing at a rapid pace. However, despite its fast growth the industry faces major challenges on its path to a healthy mature industry ... read more


W2. Workshop on the Economics of Networked Systems (NetEcon)
Organizers: Jeff Chase, Nick Feamster, and Tim Roughgarden

NetEcon merges two workshops held in previous years: P2PEcon (Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems) and PINS (Practice and Theory of Incentives in Networked Systems). The goal of the workshop is to promote a cross-disciplinary exchange of ideas on the role of game-theoretic and economic principles in the design and analysis ... read more


June 12, 2006
W3. Alternative Solution Concepts for Mechanism Design
Organizers: Jason Hartline, Ron Lavi, Amir Ronen
08:00 - 5:30
Registration outside Assembly Hall
08:30 - 9:00
Coffee in Assembly Hall East Alcove
10:40 - 12:30
AM Session
12:30 - 02:00
Lunch
02:00 - 03:20
PM Session
03:20 - 03:40
Break
03:40 - 05:00
PM Session

The study of mechanism design in computer science contexts has become a prominent theme in recent years. A fundamental question that lies in the heart of any successful design of a mechanism is what solution concept should it satisfy? Most of the early work on the border of mechanism design and computation adopted dominant strategy implementation. However, while this solution concept perhaps seems convincing, the gradual realization is that for many problem domains, this concept is too strong, leading mainly to impossibilities. On the other hand, the Bayesian model is being perceived as unrealistic, in particular for problems of high combinatorial complexity. Thus, both classic concepts of mechanism design may be inapplicable for the design of practical mechanisms. Yet, in many settings (e.g., airline pricing, TCP/IP), seemingly ad hoc mechanisms are ... read more

W4. Sponsored search competition
Organizers: Brendan Kitts, Chris Meek, Jason Hartline and Kursad Asdemir
11 - 11:59 pm
Registration outside Assembly Hall Sunday
08:00 - 5:30
Registration outside Assembly Hall Monday
08:30 - 9:00
Coffee in Assembly Hall East Alcove
12:00 am
Competition Begins
10:20 - 10:40
Break
12:30 - 02:00
Lunch
03:20 - 03:40
Break
11:59 pm
Competition Ends


Are you interested in e-commerce / machine learning / operations research / data mining / artificial intelligence? Put your skills to the ultimate test. Enter an intelligent bidding agent in the 2006 Sponsored Search Bidding Agent Competition . The winner of the 2006 Sponsored Search Bidding Agent Competition will be announced during the banquet on Wednesday, June 14. Your intelligent agent will need to balance exploration versus exploitation in real-time (the classic k-armed bandit problem), and react intelligently to fickle and potentially explosive changes ... read more

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