SBEE Seminar Series: Joel Sobel
Ehrlicher Room, 3100 North Quad
Lying and Deception in Games
This talk proposes definitions of lying, deception, and damage in strategic settings. Lying depends on the existence of accepted meanings for messages, but does not require a model of how the audience responds to messages. Deception does require a model of how the audience interprets messages, but does not directly refer to consequences. Damage requires consideration of the consequences of messages. Lies need not be deceptive. Deception does not require lying. Lying and deception are compatible with equilibrium. Sobel gives conditions under which deception must be damaging.
Joel Sobel is professor of economics at the University of California at San Diego, where he has worked for more than 40 years. He studies game theoretic models of communication and signaling. He is interested in strategic communication. He has enjoyed extended leaves at many academic institutions Oxford, Caltech, UC Berkeley, UW Madison, Stanford, Barcelona, and Amsterdam/Rotterdam. Sobel was elected a fellow of the Econometric Society in 1990 and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2010. He is the recipient of Sloan and Guggenheim Foundation Fellowships. He has served as co-editor of the American Economic Review and recently completed a term as editor of Econometrica. He earned an MA in economics and a PhD in applied mathematics at the University of California, Berkeley.
Sponsors of the Social, Behavioral and Experimental Economics Seminar Series are the School of Information, the Ross School of Business, and the Department of Economics.
This event will take place from 11:45 am - 12:45 pm.