Social, Behavioral and Experimental Economics Seminar: Yuzhao Yang, University of Michigan

Abstract

We represent a non-Bayesian agent as one who does not completely trust the information they receive. The behavioral expression of complete trust lies in a homogeneity property of Bayesian updating: posterior beliefs do not change if a signal is made arbitrarily rare by scaling down its likelihood vector. We show that simply dropping this property and retaining all other Bayesian behavioral properties yields a unique representation where the agent is still Bayesian but has subjective uncertainty over the information structure generating the signal. The representation result is proved using the Fundamental Theorem of Projective Geometry. We analyze how various updating biases may be rationalized by a lack of trust.

Link to Paper

About the SBEE Seminar Series

The Social, Behavioral and Experimental Economics seminar series brings together a community of economics scholars from three units at the University of Michigan — the School of Information, the Department of Economics and the Ross Business School — whose research aims to broaden the understanding of the social, economic and political consequences of real-life decisions and behaviors.

Top researchers from around the globe come to Michigan to present their work at the SBEE seminar series, exploring the intersection of economics, psychology, computer science and information science.

The seminar series is organized by U-M faculty members Yan Chen (UMSI), Alain Cohn (UMSI), Erin Krupka (UMSI), Stephen Leider (Ross), Christine Exley (Econ), A. Yesim Orhun (Ross), Tanya Rosenblat (UMSI), Karthik Srinivasan (UMSI) and Basit Zafar (Econ). Todd Stuart and Robin Kocher serve as seminar coordinators. 

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