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SBEE seminar series: Yingzhi Liang

10/20/2020, 10:00 am - 11:15 am
Online

A Dynamic Matching Mechanism for College Admissions: Theory and Experiment

Abstract:

Market design has provided many managerial insights into why certain market institutions fail while others succeed in allocating scarce resources in both the for- and non-profit sectors. In this paper, we analyze a new form of dynamic matching mechanism enabled by innovations in information technology. We provide a theoretical and experimental examination of this mechanism in the context of college admissions in Inner Mongolia, China, where students are given real-time allocation feedback and are allowed to revise their choices. Theoretically, we show that efficient and stable outcomes arise in every rationalizable strategy profile if there is a sufficient number of revision opportunities. Experimentally, we find that in an environment with high strategic complexity, the Inner Mongolia Dynamic mechanism performs better than theoretical predictions: It is as stable as the Deferred Acceptance mechanism and as efficient as the Boston mechanism, with higher truth-telling rate than both of them. These results suggest that the Inner Mongolia Dynamic mechanism can be a good substitute for static mechanisms in complex environments. The Inner Mongolia Dynamic mechanism may also be useful in matching potential employers and employees in the labor market.  

Speaker bio: 

Yingzhi Liang

Yingzhi Liang is a doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan, School of Information. Her research interests are behavioral and experimental economics, market and mechanism design. She designs theoretically-based mechanisms to solve social problems and evaluate them using controlled lab and field experiments.

She works with field partners in designing and conducting large scale randomized field experiments, including the largest ride-sharing company in China: DiDi, the non-profit micro-lending platform: Kiva.org, and the personalized online education platform: ECoach, and the interactive decision-making learning tool: MobLab Inc. She expects to graduate in April 2021.

 

For information on how to watch this lecture and sign up for the SBEE mailing list to receive notice of upcoming events, please visit the SBEE website: https://umbee.github.io/SBEE_Seminars

The Social, Behavioral and Experimental Economics seminar series is a joint presentation of the School of Information, the Ross School of Business and the LSA Department of Economics.